Strategy-proofness and single-dipped preferences by Öztürk, M.
  
 
Strategy-proofness and single-dipped preferences
Citation for published version (APA):
Öztürk, M. (2013). Strategy-proofness and single-dipped preferences. Maastricht: Datawyse /
Universitaire Pers Maastricht.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2013
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Stellingen (Propositions)
behorende bij het proefschrift (to accompany the thesis entitled)
“Strategy-proofness and Single-dipped Preferences”
door Murat O¨ztu¨rk
1. The desire to have an (Pareto) optimal and strategy-proof way to locate
a noxious facility on a nicely shaped area restricts possible locations to the
boundary. (Chapter 2)
2. In regions with circular boundaries, dictatorship is the only (Pareto)
optimal and strategy-proof social choice rule for locating a public bad.
(Chapter 3)
3. When considering single-dipped preference profiles over a tree shaped
network, checking validity of pairwise monotonicity of a solution is
enough for checking validity of Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, non-
corruptness and anonymity. (Chapter 4)
4. If one of two neighboring countries has a public bad already, this forces
the other country to locate theirs inside their territory in some occasions.
(Chapter 5)
5. In a world where everyone can vote as they wish, the optimal way to
prevent people from lying is not listening to them at all, except to one of
them .
6. Deciding how to elect is one of the many ways to manipulate an elec-
tion.
7. Restricting preferences of people may look unethical at first glance, but
it can be logical and understandable to avoid a dictator.
8. The downside of mathematics is that it cannot fully represent the com-
plexity of humanity, but, still, it can build a close enough model.
